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Abstract: This article focuses on migration within the European Union, exploring the
gradual restriction of rights for ›free movers‹ in connection with the restructuring of wel-
fare towards workfare policies. Based on analysis of secondary sources, case laws and
qualitative interview material with migrant support organisations and legal experts, the
author explores the intersection between welfare and migration controls in the United
Kingdom to highlight the rapid erosion of social assistance and social security rights for
EU migrants. The article takes this national context as a point of departure to examine
wider developments in other EU countries where similar patterns of restriction both at the
judicial and policy levels emerge under the mark of workfarist politics and the ›activation
paradigm‹. The main argument is that measures applied in the context of the workfare
reforms enhancing the vulnerability of the precarious workforce are experienced in exem-
plar ways by migrants, stigmatised as fraudulent benefit claimants and in fact compelled
to provide their labour under increasingly precarious conditions. The inter-dependency
between the proof of habitual residence, retention of worker status and entitlements to in-
work benefits emerges as a central mechanism in the government of mobility at a critical
moment in the ›undoing of Europe‹.
Keywords: migration, mobility, United Kingdom, workfare, habitual residence, precarity,
Brexit
Two types of movements traverse the crisis ›space‹ of the European Union: a cen-
trifugal one at the external border, represented by the member states’ rejection of the
many migrants and refugees escaping war, oppression and poverty; and a centripetal
one at the internal border, expressed in the shrinking space of free circulation and
social protections for EU migrants.
While migration studies have tended to focus on the effects of Fortress Europe
at its outer frontier, the present article shifts the gaze to movements within the
EU. I explore the gradual restriction of rights for ›free movers‹ in connection with
the restructuring of welfare towards workfare policies by focusing on a particular
national context. The United Kingdom, in line with other OECD countries, has
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seen a trend of reform based on the principle of fighting ›welfare dependency‹ by
moving claimants into paid work through the introduction of tougher welfare con-
ditionality and sanctions (Gilbert/Besharov 2011). These are meant to ›motivate‹
claimants into employment, but in fact punish those who do not play by the rules,
such as failing to attend an interview at the Job Centre (Patrick 2014). The re-
ality of workfare programmes often results in reproducing »low-pay-no pay cycles«
(Shildrick/Macdonald/Webster/Garthwaite 2012), where claimants moving in and out
of the job market are pressured to accept poorly paid and demeaning jobs to avoid
sanctions or simply to escape the humiliating and exhausting benefit systems (Greer
2015; Patrick 2014).
This article takes welfare reform as a critical background to explore the exclusion
of migrants from social assistance and social security in the UK. It then refers to
other cases across the EU, where migrants have been denied social rights on equal
terms with citizens, to show that the restrictive policies of the UK are an exam-
ple of wider trends. I follow a mixed exploratory methodology where I draw from
a wider project on the regulation of labour, social rights, and economic freedoms
(Schiek/Oliver/Forde/Alberti 2015), which includes interviews with experts and prac-
titioners supporting the free movement rights of migrants as well as an analysis of
case laws and secondary sources such as policies of the UK and other member states.
From a review of policy developments in the UK, it appears that mobility, residence
and social citizenship rights are being eroded, not only for non-EU, but increasingly
also for EU migrants. The research shows the emergence of a mechanism of welfare
and migration controls based on the conditionality of retaining worker status for the
purpose of claiming social benefits. Under this new government, the proof of ›effec-
tive work‹ or of having a ›genuine prospect of work‹ (already introduced in British
policy in the 1990s) appear central to the management of migrants’ workfare.
These trends are sustained by the UK government and mounting discourses in the
media about the alleged burden that migrants constitute as ›welfare tourists‹ on the
nation. Such rhetoric has fuelled the growth of anti-immigrant sentiment and of xeno-
phobic parties, both contributing to the result of the UK referendum to leave the
EU. In the period leading to the referendum, British media widely publicized the re-
gressive judgments by the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU), such as the cases of
Dano1 and Alimanovic2 in Germany, where low-income EU jobseekers and precar-
ious workers have been deemed unworthy of receiving state allowances. The UK
1 | Case C-333/13 Dano, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2358 (cited in Schiek et al. 2015: 51).
2 | Case C-67/14 Jobcenter Berlin Neukölln vs Alimanovic, ECLI:EU:C:2015:597 (cited in
Schiek et al. 2015: 52).
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government has referred to these judgments to legitimise its attempt to curtail the so-
cial entitlements of internal migrants (The Guardian 2014). The CJEU judgments are
therefore considered here to show how similar policy trends determine the exclusion
of migrants from social citizenship in other EU countries and not only in ›Brexit(ing)
UK‹.
If the logic of differential inclusion (Mezzadra/Neilson 2013; Papadopoulos/Steph-
enson/Tsianos 2008) under the EU border regime is still largely based on the division
between EU and non-EU migrants, we witness a transfer of similar mechanisms such
as the link between employment and habitual residence from non-EU to intra-EU
migration. Indeed, the interdependence between work and migration status has been
at the core of migration policies across the Global North, where proof of work is the
condition to obtain the right to reside for non-EU migrants and a key factor of their
precariousness (Anderson 2010). A specific mode of regulating the longstanding
relationship between state welfare controls and the reproduction of migrant labour
force emerges as centred on the »activation paradigm«, where the emphasis laid on
paid employment is combined with the rising selectivity against hitherto protected
categories of migrants in terms of their access to an increasingly residual welfare
state (Wright 2011).
In contrast to the narratives that deepen the ›us versus them‹ sentiment, my intent
is to show the common rationale between the restrictions on migrant social rights
through the tweaking of their worker status and the neoliberal notion of »deserving-
ness« at the core of contemporary workfare regimes that elect paid employment as
a civic obligation for all citizens (see also Chauvin et al. 2013). It is my view that
measures applied in the context of the workfarist programmes enhancing the vulner-
ability of the precarious workforce (Greer 2015; Patrick 2014) are experienced in
exemplary ways by migrants, stigmatised as fraudulent benefit claimants, and in fact
compelled to provide their labour under increasingly precarious conditions. These
restrictive measures appear strategic for the government of labour mobility in the
shrinking space of free movement in the EU.
MIGRANTS WORKING IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
Before providing the policy context of the UK, it is important to have an understand-
ing of the composition of labour force in this country and the positioning of both
EU and non-EU migrants across sectors. The link between migration and welfare
can in fact be better understood against the backdrop of changing segmentation of
workforce along occupational, gendered, and contractual lines.
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While there are about 8.3 million foreign-born in the UK, defined as those born
outside of the UK (Hawkins 2017), the proportion of citizens from other EU coun-
tries has visibly increased in the last decade, with about 1.9 million EU-born workers
in the UK in 2015. Among them, half of those who came in 2014 and stayed for over
12 months are from the post-enlargement EU member states (Migration Observatory
2016). Since 2008 and the impact of the financial crisis and austerity on workers,
more migrants have arrived in the UK from the southern countries of the EU. Nation-
als of EU-14 member states accounted for half of the total of EU migration in 2014,
while nationals from Bulgaria and Rumania (›EU-2‹) and the other accession coun-
tries (Croatia, Malta, Cyprus) represented 20% of the total (Vargas-Silva/Markaki
2016).
In terms of labour market patterns, the proportion of migrants in low-skill em-
ployment has increased among those arriving after 2010, especially from the EU-
8 and EU-2 countries, as well as among the older EU members from Italy and
Spain, Greece, and Portugal (MAC 2014: 52). Since 2013, wages of male mi-
grants have gone down as compared to those of UK-born men. A higher amount
of EU-8 migrants gather in low skilled and low paid occupations with insecure con-
tracts (e.g. in elementary process plants, cleaning, housekeeping, and process oper-
atives) (Rienzo 2016: 4). Many migrant women, whether from the new European
migrant communities or long-term ethnic minority groups, tend to be segregated in
low-wage, menial and feminised jobs at the bottom end of the service industries
(May/Wills/Datta/Evans/Herbert/McIlwaine 2007).
A wide range of qualitative research shows that EU migrants tend to fill the gaps at
the bottom end of the job market, experience lower payment, unpaid overtime as well
as intense and long working hours while facing precarious contracts since the years
of EU Enlargement (2004 for the EU-8 and 2006 for Bulgaria and Romania) (Alberti
2014; Ciupijus 2011; Cook/Dwyer/Waite 2011).
Many precarious, hourly paid and zero-hours contract jobs3 are often taken by mi-
grants. Polish, Lithuanians, Romanians and Portuguese are the predominant groups
in low-skilled and low-paid jobs, like elementary processing and cleaning. And yet,
3 | Zero-hour contract is a relatively new category of casual employment affecting a growing
amount of workers in the UK that is defined as type of employment that does not guarantee a
minimum number of hours or employment protections. According to the Office for National
Statistics (2017) during October to December 2016 there were 905,000 people employed on
»zero-hours contracts« in their main job (2.8% of all people in employment). This is 101,000
people more than in the same quartile in the year 2015 – and still these figures are likely to be
under-estimates.
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migrants from outside the EU and especially post-colonial migrants from Africa and
Asia4 still constitute the majority of all low-skilled employment (60% in 2013) (MAC
2014: 34).
The relatively different labour market positions of EU migrants and non-EU mi-
grants in the UK are influenced by the ways in which their migration status is reg-
ulated under national migration law. Since 2008, while non-EU migrants are chan-
nelled into the UK via a strict visa regime, based on skills, age, and income criteria set
out by the UK Points-based system, and their legal residence tends to be bound to a
work permit, EU migrants, until now, did not need a sponsor or a contract of employ-
ment to enter the UK legally. Yet, the group of EU migrants is far from being inter-
nally homogenous, since not all categories are treated equally: EU-2 in the UK have
been subject to post-enlargement transitional measures that involved employment re-
strictions. For instance, until 2014, EU-2 could only enter either as self-employed
or under the Agricultural Scheme. Beside legal barriers to the labour market, critical
migration scholars have pointed out other dimensions, including the racialised and
cultural constructs applied to certain EU nationals based on their alleged economic
value and morality, creating a layered EU citizenship (Vianello 2012).
Understanding the position of migrants in the UK labour market helps to explain
why non-UK born people have been more likely to claim so called in-work benefits
(Sumption/Allen 2015). Because these migrants tend to be paid less and employed
with insecure contracts, they rightly seek welfare support. At the same time, the mo-
tivations and characteristics of the migrant workforce explain why both EU and non-
EU migrants in the UK are underrepresented among out-of-work benefits claimants,
as compared to the British population (Sumption/Allen 2015).
Looking across the EU, migrants accounted for 1 to 5% of benefit claimants in
2014 (European Commission 2014), meaning that the rest (95 to 99%) of benefit
claimants were UK nationals. Recent research confirms that the extent to which so-
called non-active intra-EU migrants take advantage of non-contributory benefits is
small (European Commission 2013a). Migrants do not claim benefits to the same
extent than UK citizens do, mainly because they tend to be in employment more often
(in 2013, activity rates were 77.7% on average for mobile EU citizens, as compared to
72% for UK nationals), and thus less likely to receive disability and unemployment
benefits (European Commission 2014). Healthcare expenditure was also marginal
4 | The categories more likely to be found in low-paid work were Central and Western Africans
(Ghanaian and Nigerians), Eastern Africans (especially Somalis), migrants from the Philippines
and other parts of Southern and Eastern Asia, South America and the Caribbean (MAC 2014:
34)
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for these groups (0.2% on average of total expenditure, see Eurostat 2016, cited in
European Commission 2013a).
Having considered the stratified position of migrants in the UK labour market and
their comparatively limited demand on welfare, it is critical to further explore how
welfare rights are related to free movement rights, as well as to migrants’ underval-
ued and insecure work. I thus turn to the existing provisions of benefit support to
migrants in the UK and their historical antecedents at the origin of the British system
of workfare and migration controls.
MIGRANTS AND THE BRITISH WORKFARE REGIME
One of the main issues at the centre of Britain’s past negotiation with other member
states to forestall the country’s exit from the EU (EUCO 2016) (now nullified by the
Leave vote), has been the quest for limiting access to in-work benefits for migrants.
Political and regulatory developments in the field of EU internal migration in the UK
have proceeded on the basis that there is a need to reduce the burden of alleged non-
citizens on the welfare state of host countries, but this burden has never been proven.
The myth of ›welfare tourism‹ is in contrast not only linked to figures demonstrating
the small proportion of migrants’ claims cited above, but also to the lack of evidence
on the claim that migrants would move to any particular member state in order to
claim social benefits. Despite the fact that the UK has been one of the countries
in the EU to provide relatively generous cash benefits for working families on low
income and with children, an examination of data from the CBS Minimum Income
Protection Indicators (Van Mechelen/Marchal/Goedemé/Marx 2011) shows that the
average income of migrants in the UK has not been brought up by in-work benefits
to the point of constituting a pull factor. Conclusions cannot be drawn solely on the
basis of economic calculations, also because transnational migration is not merely
driven by the choice of »rational economic individuals dancing on the tunes of wage
rates« (Rogers/Anderson/Clark 2009: 45), or responding mechanically to the degree
of generosity of welfare or presence of cash benefits in a given country.
With regard to the alleged impact of migration on public welfare resources, Dust-
mann and Frattini’s (2014) analysis of the Labour Force Survey shows that immi-
grants residing in the UK between 1995 and 2011 were less likely to receive state
benefits or tax credits and less likely to live in social housing than UK-born citizens
in the same region. These authors concluded that »especially those from EEA coun-
tries have, through their positive net fiscal contributions, helped to reduce the fiscal
burden for native workers« (Dustmann/Frattini 2014: F595). Thus, recent restrictive
The Government of Migration through Workfare in the UK | 7
developments on welfare rights for internal migrants do not appear to arise from any
factual figure of benefit abuse. They must rather be located in the context of harsher
welfare rules, including those that apply to unemployed or precariously employed
British citizens (Shildrick et al. 2012).
Since the Welfare Reform Act 2012, introduced by the Tory/Liberal Democrat
Coalition, the principle of ›welfare conditionality‹, in continuity with the preceding
New Labour government’s idea of paid work as »the best form of welfare«, has been
extended and made tougher (Patrick 2014: 706). Such conditionality means, for in-
stance, that those claimants who fail to comply with work-related conditions for three
times will lose eligibility for benefits for three years. Research shows how ›getting
by‹ on benefits often involves actual hard work (whether paid or unpaid), and how the
very welfare system becomes productive of precarity to the extent that it reinforces
dynamics where people shift in and out of the job market, and claimants are pushed
to accept zero-hour contracts and other ›marginal‹ jobs in order to maintain relative
access to the welfare system. But how does this conditionality play out in the case of
non-citizens? A consideration of the historical links between welfare and migration
controls in the UK and the current regulation at EU level helps grasping the issues at
stake (Cohen/Humphries/Mynott 2002).
CHRONOLOGIES OF DISENTITLEMENT
While the UK has recently voted to leave the EU, also based on alleged ›welfare
tourism‹ and ›uncontrolled‹ immigration from other member states, the policy and
legislative steps taken by successive governments in the last decades are indicative
of a gradual pathway towards the restriction of social benefits for migrants. This
happens mainly by imposing further conditionality also on internal migrants, who
have to demonstrate their ›right to reside‹ to claim benefits.
Cohen, Humphries and Mynott (2002: 1) were among the first in the UK to explic-
itly tackle the link between migration and welfare controls, arguing that immigration
controls extend beyond physical borders by involving »the restriction of access to
welfare provision on the ground of immigration status«. Restrictions against cate-
gories of migrants who are subject to immigration controls, and in particular asylum
seekers, are applied especially in the fields of social assistance or so-called means-
tested benefits. A key step in the pattern of excluding immigrants from welfare provi-
sion has been the Immigration and Asylum act introduced by the Labour government
in 1999, which established the exclusion of anyone ›subject to immigration controls‹
from recourse to public funds, including a swathe of welfare provisions, such as in-
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come support, housing benefits, and council tax benefits, among others (Hayes 2002:
40). A new version of the Poor laws5 has been applied to asylum seekers, who cover
a peculiar position in the hierarchy of entitlements in the UK: While they are ex-
cluded from national welfare, their access to (indeed very low) standards of living is
administered under a separated system called the ›Asylum Support Services‹ (May-
blin 2014). Since asylum seekers are excluded from the right to work in the UK
(since 2002), their status perhaps represents the most extreme end of the continuum
in the correlation between migration and welfare policy, as they are, at the same time,
deprived of the right to work and excluded from the welfare system accessible to citi-
zens (and until now, EU migrants). Synonymous to the ›benefit scroungers‹ is indeed
the ›bogus asylum seeker‹, whereby an ideology of underservingness and unwanted
immigration supports the paradoxical policy that asylum seekers are de facto forced
into welfare dependency (Mayblin 2014: 377).
In order to understand the present mechanisms of welfare and migration controls, it
is important to further clarify the distinction between two types of benefits in the UK.
One class of benefits are out of work non-contributory benefits such as job seekers
allowance, access to which has been curbed in the past years also for EU migrants
through harsher rules over residency rights, whereby internal migrants have to pass
an additional ›right to reside test‹ linked to proof of employment. Critically, such
right to reside was introduced in 2004 by an amendment to the regulation regarding
the rights to social security benefits, such as the Job Seeker’s Allowance, with the
aim to protect the UK’s social system from alleged threats of ›benefit tourism‹ (Euro-
pean Commission 2013a: 166). This right was linked to the ›habitual residence test‹,
which was in turn introduced in 1994 by the then Labour government to respond to
concerns that EU students were coming to the UK just to access benefits (Patterson
2002: 168)6. What constitutes habitual residence has been historically established
in common law. A milestone judgment has been the ›Shah vs Barnett Borough of
London‹ case, which defines ordinary residence as »being voluntary in the UK for
5 | The Poor laws of late Medieval era (effectively in place until the setting up of the Beveridge
reform modern welfare state after the Second World War) tended to differentiate individuals
considered worthy of state support from those not deserving on the basis of relative engagement
with paid employment (Anderson 2013; Patrick 2014).
6 | It is worth noting that its predecessor, the so-called presence test, initially introduced in
1985 by the Green Paper Reform of social security and which jeopardised EC citizens’ right
to ›supplementary benefits‹ (the precursor of income support and JSA), was dropped in the
following policy, as it was considered a breach of the Treaty of Rome normal rule of equal
access to supplementary benefits in the first six months of migrants’ stay.
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any settle purpose in addition to a requirement to provide proof of an acceptable pe-
riod of actual residence« (Patterson 2002: 169). Those hit hardest by the changes
were Black and Asian ethnic minorities, who had long settled but who had returned
from extended family visits in their home countries (especially the Indian subconti-
nent) (Patterson 2002), which illustrates how restrictions initially introduced against
EU migrant students end up affecting larger groups, including non-EU and racialised
groups.
A second class of benefits in the UK are in-work benefits, consisting of a series of
integrative social measures for people in employment, including working tax credits,
housing benefits, and child-care financial support for working families whose income
is relatively low. Historically created to provide a way to subsidise low wages at
the bottom end of the labour market, such provisions have worked as anti-poverty
measures for a large number of citizens and migrants. Until now, in-work benefits
have been immediately available to workers from elsewhere in the EU, according to
the core principle of EU law on the coordination of social security systems.
SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP UNDER EU LAW
The distinction between in and out of work benefits reflects the distinction in EU law
between contributory and special non-contributory benefits, developed since 1971 as
part of its system of coordination concerning social rights for free moving workers
and citizens. Accordingly, all workers should have the same access to benefits of
the first type. Transnational social security for EU free moving workers is currently
governed by EU regulations 883/2004 on the coordination of social security systems
and implemented by regulation 987/2009. The original scope of coordinating social
security is to avoid discrimination for moving workers and to incentivise their mo-
bility (Caldarini/Giubboni/MacKay 2014: 9). With regard to the free movement of
persons, the Directive 2004/38 or Citizenship Rights Directive (CDR) establishes the
general principle that EU citizens have a right to reside in another member state, no
matter if they are in or out of work, as long as they have sufficient resources to not
become a burden on the social assistance system of the host state and are covered by
sickness insurance (EC/2004/38, Article 7).
The European Commission has confirmed this dual system reserved to persons as
opposed to workers (and jobseekers who retain worker status), stating that »while EU
law on the free movement of Union citizens does allow Member States to restrict ac-
cess to social assistance, EU rules on coordination of social security do not allow for
restrictions on social security benefits in the case of EU nationals that are workers,
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direct family members of workers or habitually resident in the Member State in ques-
tion« (European Commission 2013b: 2). Critically, for current developments in the
UK as well as for the cases that we will consider below, this means that EU migrants
residing in a different member state and considered economically inactive can only
demand full equal treatment after establishing a ›sufficient link‹ to the host state.
According to the CRD, EU migrant jobseekers enjoy freedom of movement until
it is taken away from them by the responsible ministerial office. And yet, under EU
law, member states retain the right to limit equal treatment in the sphere of social
assistance claims (non-contributory out of work benefits) for certain categories:
»[. . . ] a Union citizen who is no longer a worker or self-employed
person shall retain the status of worker or self-employed person in the
following circumstances (c) he/she is in duly recorded involuntary un-
employment after completing a fixed-term employment contract of less
than a year or after having become involuntarily unemployed during the
first twelve months and has registered as a job-seeker with the relevant
employment office. In this case, the status of worker shall be retained
for no less than six months.« (EC/2014/38, Article 7 (3c))
We will see how these principles have been exploited in other instances of case law
against migrant claimants such as in Germany, while it emerges that policy changes
in the UK have been openly geared towards restricting the chances of migrants to
retain worker status for the scope of claiming benefits.
THE MANIPULATION OF WORKER STATUS TO LIMIT
THE ACCESS OF MIGRANTS TO BENEFITS
The UK has indeed interpreted the habitual residence in a gradually restrictive man-
ner in order to curb access to welfare and their mobility for migrants. Since De-
cember 2013, a »stronger, more robust« habitual residence test has been introduced
in the UK for those claiming means-tested benefits (e.g. income-based jobseeker’s
allowance, working tax, and child tax credits). According to the new rules, »[f]or
those EEA jobseekers or former workers with a right to reside as a jobseeker a test
is now applied where they would have to show that they had a ›genuine prospect of
finding work‹ to continue to get JSA after six months« (and if applicable, housing
benefit, child benefit and child tax credit) (Kennedy 2015: 3). While what constitutes
compelling evidence of a genuine prospect of finding work is far from being defined,
the Department of Work and Pension clarified that it may involve a written job offer
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with a date of commencement (Kennedy 2015: 18).7 The government produced a
set of guidelines for front desk workers conducting those tests to help them establish
whether applicants fulfil the requirements around the proof of genuine prospect of
work and prove that the UK has become their ›habitual centre of interest‹.
This UK rule can be claimed to be partly in contradiction with Article 24 (2) of the
CRD. According to the directive, first time jobseekers are one of the three categories
of people from whom member states have the right to withhold social assistance
benefits. »First time jobseekers« are defined under Article 14 (4) by the CRD as those
who »entered the territory of the host member state in order to seek employment [. . . ]
as long as [they] are continuing to seek employment and [. . . ] have a genuine chance
of being engaged«. Since the right to claim JSA after six months in the UK depends
on the proof of genuine prospect of work also for those who are no longer first time
jobseekers, the UK regulation appears in contradiction with EU law (Schiek 2015a).
With regard to my focus on the link between migration and welfare controls, it is
notable that social assistance measures appear to be increasingly bent to labour mar-
ket ›activation measures‹, which emphasise the need to provide support that facilitate
integration of the claimants into the job market. In the UK, such increasing condi-
tionality becomes apparent for both citizens and migrants (Greer 2015; Patrick 2014).
In the case of migrants, the situation is made more difficult by the fact that differen-
tiating access to entitlements according to migrants’ employment status is explicitly
aimed at circumventing the looser definition of ›worker‹ under EU law, which, ac-
cording to the UK Government (2014), »allows people more generous access to in
and out-of-work benefits«. In line with this restrictive approach, from November
2014 onwards and after 91 days of claiming income-based JSA, EU migrants who
do not prove to have an imminent job offer may lose their benefits and, crucially,
their right to reside in the UK as a jobseeker (UK Government 2014). Additionally, a
minimum earning threshold corresponding to the level at which employees start pay-
ing the national insurance contributions (about £150 per week) has been introduced
in March 2014. The government aims to further ensure that benefits will only go to
those who are ›genuinely working‹, thus further entrenching the workfare logics of
migration controls.
It emerges that the very definition of who qualifies as a worker appears crucial
in determining access to social benefits. The detrimental impact of such restrictive
7 | Precedent guidance in 1993 stated that ›EC work seekers with no genuine chance of finding
work‹ after six months on income support, may have to leave the UK although there was no
power to deport, and legal challenges were due (Patterson 2002: 163). It is worth noting that
this guidance was successfully challenged in the House of Lords.
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measures, especially for the many migrants employed under the increasingly popular
zero-hours contracts and other so-called ancillary types of employment, has been
stressed above (see also Anderson 2013).
RESTRICTIVE COURT JUDGMENTS AGAINST MIGRANTS IN
THE UK AND BEYOND
Judicial and policy developments in the UK and other EU countries illustrate simi-
lar restrictive trends. Leaving beside the specificities of the UK system concerning
welfare and migration controls, one can account that UK and European courts alike
have played a key role in legitimising the withdrawal of rights from migrants. Inter-
views with policy experts and front desk practitioners offering legal support to EU
migrants in the spheres of mobility and social rights provide evidence of a common
tendency across the UK and other EU countries to restrict access to social protections
for internal migrants (Schiek et al. 2015).
An informant from an EU rights clinic based in Brussels gave evidence of with-
drawals of migrants’ social and health services entitlements by UK national courts.
The expert gave examples of how the most vulnerable individuals were among EU
migrants out of work, who appeared to be targets of a ›punitive approach‹ because
of their alleged welfare abuse. This was the case of an EU worker married with a
non-EU citizen, who was denied residency rights on the basis of having used the Na-
tional Health System while unemployed. The denial of residency based on ›abuse‹ of
social assistance very clearly illustrates a culture of sanctioning that characterises the
UK ›welfare to work‹ regime, reflecting the logic of »deservingness« of neoliberal
welfare systems (Chauvin/Garcés-Mascareñas/Kraler 2013) as well as expectations
of economic self-sufficiency.
While these principles of sanctioning, deservingness and welfare dependency are
increasingly integrated into the recent regulations of welfare rights, also for internal
migrants, we have seen how the roots of workfare regimes functioning as a tool of
migration regulation run deeply into the history of migration and welfare controls in
the UK, namely into the exclusion of non-EU migrants from access to public wel-
fare (Cohen/Humphries/Mynott 2002). A novelty is that, while migrants who are
temporarily out of work have been the first target of the attack by EU countries’ gov-
ernments against ›welfare tourists‹, recent case law shows a gradual erosion of rights,
also for former workers. Within Belgium, a variety of instances concerning revoca-
tions of social benefits emerged from the interviews with the Italian ›patronato‹ INCA
(a Brussels-based organisation that supports Italians working and living abroad). It
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emerged how ›free movers‹ in search of work because of sudden unemployment are
particularly vulnerable to the same rhetoric on welfare tourism. An Italian worker
who moved to Belgium after his company closed down during the economic crisis,
and who subsequently was made unemployed by his new Belgian employer, was
inquired as a ›dangerous social tourist‹ despite the fact that he provided proof of
searching for work and learning the local language. Nonetheless, the Belgian gov-
ernment considered that he had no chance of finding a job, and, after five months of
unemployment, this migrant received an expulsion order, hence losing unemployment
benefits both in Italy and Belgium despite having worked for many years (Interview
with INCA representative, March 2015).
Other cases of EU migrants’ disentitlement have been found in other EU coun-
tries. Similar to the UK case, the German approach to administrating migrants’ access
to social provisions has given central prominence to the proof of habitual residence
and the retention of worker statuses for migrant claimants. There have been parallel
changes in the German law of residence, according to which from December 2014
onwards, EU migrant jobseekers are legally entitled to stay for only six months un-
less they have financial resources to support themselves. After the six months, they
must provide documentation to the foreign registration office that they have a ›gen-
uine prospect of getting employed‹ while it is far from clear what kind of proof will
be accepted (Achenbach 2015). It is worth emphasising that the foreign registration
office is allowed to enquire into an EU migrant’s right to stay only if there is a gen-
uine reason for suspicion, which can (but does not need to) consist in receiving social
benefits. Despite this, there have been draconian judgments for migrants living in
Germany (Jacqueson/Hilten-Cavallius 2015; Schiek 2015a; Valcke 2015), including
the Dano vs Jobcenter Leipzig case ruled by the European Court of Justice (CJEU) in
2013, which was exploited by the British government to ›vindicate‹ its argument to
curb migrants’ benefits during the pre-referendum negotiation (Caldarini/Goldmann
2016; The Guardian 2014). This judgment is illustrative of the demonisation of mi-
grant jobseekers, as it ruled that a Romanian national in Germany was rightly denied
subsistence benefits, social allowances, and a contribution to housing and heating for
herself and her son. Crucially, these benefits were withdrawn also on the basis that
Dano was conceived of having moved to Germany with the sole purpose of obtain-
ing social assistance without sufficient resources to claim ›a right of residence‹ (see
Schiek et al. 2015; Schiek 2015a).
In the more recent judgment Jobcenter Berlin Neukölln vs Alimanovic by the
CJEU (September 2015), the same restrictive principle has been extended to re-
strict the right of an EU free mover with a past employment history. Despite being
Swedish citizens of Bosnian origin, Ms Alimanovic and her daughter (16 years old)
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had already obtained lawful residence in July 2010 (»unbefristete Bescheinigung der
Freizügigkeit nach §5 FreizügG/EU«8) after they re-entered Berlin. At the same time,
their social benefits were withheld on the basis that the Alimanovics had been unem-
ployed for more than six months after having worked in Germany for less than a year.
This happened, despite Ms Alimanovic and her older daughter working in temporary
jobs between June 2010 and May 2011, upon return to Germany. Kramer points out
in a case analysis:
»[. . . ] whereas in Dano the Court still refers to the ›fundamental sta-
tus‹ of Union citizenship and explicitly affirms Article 24 (2) as an ex-
ception to the fundamental principle of non-discrimination, Alimanovic
confirms a symbolic reversal by skipping any reference to Union citizen-
ship and straightly moving to residence conditions deservingness [. . . ].«
(Kramer 2015)
By contrast, Schiek (2015a) emphasises how, in that context, the problem was rather
revolving around the retention of a worker status and that the withdrawal of rights
from the Alimanovics contradicts the application of the notion of ›first time job
seeker‹ under EU law (see above). The contestation for Schiek is that, according
to the CJEU ruling, the Alimanovics fell back on to the category of first time job-
seeker after becoming unemployed, despite the fact that they had worked in the past.
But the legal expert remarks the contradiction that »[while they] were no longer first-
time job seekers, Germany could not rely on Article 24 (2) CRD in withdrawing their
job seeker allowance« (Schiek 2015a).
Overall it emerges that, not only in the UK, but also in other countries such as
Belgium and Germany, the logics of deservingness and activation under workfare
regimes assume specific forms of subjectivity for non-citizens, giving rise to new
forms of precariousness across the social and employment realms. Migrants appear
as a true example of changes occurring in the government of welfare and labour
mobility at a time of crisis, when they become ›bargaining chips‹ in the process of
re-negotiating the internal boundaries of EU citizenship.
8 | An »unbefristete Bescheinigung« was just a kind of certificate of one’s freedom of move-
ment (it has been abolished in 2013). It is different from a »Daueraufenthaltsrecht«, which
corresponds to the »permanent residence« very much sought after by EU migrants in the UK,
who are increasingly anxious about the impact Brexit will have on their status.
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TOWARDS A WORKFARE EUROPE WITH
RESTRICTED MOBILITY?
This article has tackled the relationship between migration and welfare controls
for precarious migrant workers and jobseekers against the backdrop of welfare re-
trenchment. I focused on the case of migrants in the UK, but considered examples
from other countries as indicative of similarly restrictive patterns across the EU. The
overview of literature, policy developments, and qualitative research with migrant
support organisations in countries like the UK, Belgium, and Germany highlight a
critical intersection between activation policies under workfare measures and restric-
tive policies increasingly encroaching on EU migrants’ mobility and residence rights.
While the UK has started to strip the social rights of internal migrants well before
Brexit, other member states, together with national and supranational judiciaries, also
appear to be taking a regressive approach by denying rights and withdrawing subsis-
tence benefits and employment support, even from those who previously worked
(Kramer 2015; Schiek 2015a; Schiek 2015b). This contradicts the original principle
of equal treatment that lies at the roots of the EU social security framework (Cal-
darini/Goldman 2016; Schiek 2015a).
The UK case is also a telling example of a broader trend towards a creeping erosion
of rights for non-citizens, where commonalities between EU and non-EU immigrants
subject to immigration controls demonstrate a rhetoric based on notions of deserv-
ingness, abject categories of unwanted migrants, and the reproduction of migrants’
availability to work precariously, e.g. for low-wages, as conditions to access wel-
fare benefits. A core contradiction emerges between the practice of moving people
off benefits into low-paid employment under the welfare-to-work ›activation agenda‹
(Wright 2011), and the withdrawal of income-based support from mobile and vulner-
able people, including single mothers and former refugees, which traps them further
into the cycle of precarity (Shildrick et al. 2012). The regulatory changes of the last
few years, including those around the definition of the worker status, the proof of its
retention after periods of unemployment, and the introduction of an earning thresh-
old in the UK turn migrants into the primary target of ›workfarist policies‹ (Mayblin
2014; Patrick 2014). While entitlements to social provisions are made conditional
upon workers’ availability to accept precarious and poorly paid jobs reinforcing a
re-commodification of labour for everyone (Greer 2015), I showed how these mech-
anisms exacerbate work-dependency and precarity for migrants in particular.
Legal scholars such as Schiek (2015b: 50) have insisted that blurring distinctions
between worker or jobseeker or more specifically »the mixing of rights for econom-
ically active and inactive citizens« are at the root of the problem, and make it more
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difficult to prove the retention of worker status, and the cause of weakening pro-
tections for free moving workers. I am sceptical that a clearer distinction between
these two categories represents a solution especially given the very unstable nature
of employment and the common experience of intermittent work in current times. A
paradoxical situation arises: At the same time as work becomes more precarious, un-
certain, temporary, and unable to provide for one’s own social reproduction, access
to social protection is made dependent on the capacity to demonstrate a full worker
status. Social rights appear under attack precisely for the most vulnerable migrants,
pushing them to situations of in-work poverty or destitution. I thus rather suggest to
interpret the productive link between limiting social protection, employment, and free
movement rights as an attempt to curb migrant agency in the labour market. As re-
ported more than a decade ago by the Migrant Right Centre in Ireland, migrants who
did not pass the Habitual Residence Condition requirement appeared disempowered
in their »ability to assert their employment rights vis-a-vis their employers« (MRCI
2005: 59). Rising barriers to accessing social benefits also for EU migrants not only
question the link between equal treatment and principles of free movement, but crit-
ically undermine the bargaining power of these workers at the workplace and within
the job market (Alberti 2016).
Welfare controls, when combined with migration controls, not only have an im-
pact on the general position of migrants within the labour market (Anderson 2010),
but they also give rise to a particular re-stratification of social citizenship inside the
EU (Vianello 2012). Considering the shrinking space of free movement and social
rights for migrants in the EU, I thus present a pattern of convergence between EU and
non-EU migrants, whereby the link between employment and habitual residence as a
mode of governing mobility is emulated from non-EU into intra-EU migration. These
processes appear instrumental to the »government of mobility« in Europe (Connes-
sioni Precarie 2014), making migrants more available, disposable, and compliant vis-
a-vis their employers. It is the reproduction of a precarious workforce, with no social
security cushion, under constant risk of falling into poverty, and pushed to accept
lower standards that such regulatory restrictions concur to generate. Such regulatory
and political contestations played on the back of migrants further question what is left
of the European ›social project‹. As the idea of a social Europe further disintegrates,
and with it perhaps the very EU as a supra-national political entity, the movement
of migrants across borders and their claims to social rights and residency are rather
likely to continue. Migration asserts itself, once again, as a social movement with an
unmanageable force.
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